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I. INTRODUCTION
It is time for all of us to change our assumptions about
what is and is not possible as we secure our competitive future
into the twenty-first century. We must challenge the naysayers
who claim that the only hope for business in the global economy
is to erect protection. We must challenge those who doubt the
capacity of the North American worker to adjust to the pres-
sures and demands of the global market. And we must chal-
lenge the view that we cannot address our environmental needs
at the same time that we open markets.
Many in North America must change their views about free
trade. Free trade is not a factory closer and plant mover. Free
trade is an export and job creator. This is why Presidents Bush
and Clinton faced tremendous domestic political criticism to
negotiate a North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
and supplemental agreements on labor and the environment
with Canada and Mexico. Their vision for NAFTA was to make
America more globally competitive. Their vision was to link the
United States to its first and third largest trading partners-
Canada and Mexico-to form the richest market in the world:
370 million people with a total output of $6.5 trillion. Presi-
dents Bush and Clinton knew that exports are one of the bright-
est spots in our economy and that a North American trade
agreement would lock in export market opportunities.
Exports have accounted for 70% of our U.S. economic
growth since 1988. The United States has regained its position
as the world's number one exporter, with $448 billion in mer-
chandise exports and $179 billion in services exports. These
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exports supported 7.5 million jobs in 1991, up 42% from 5.0 mil-
lion in 1986. These export-related jobs pay 17% more than the
average U.S. job ($3500 per year). Well over a quarter of these
jobs (28%) stem from exports to our North American neighbors.
Booming U.S. exports of goods and services to Mexico already
support 700,000 jobs here at home-chiefly in manufacturing.
Our exports to Canada support an additional 1.5 million jobs.
II. TRADE WITH OUR NORTH AMERICAN NEIGHBORS Is A
SUCCESS STORY
A. Mexico and Canada Are Major Markets
United States' exports to our North American neighbors
are growing 56% faster than our exports to the rest of the world.
Combined three-way merchandise trade in 1992 was over $264
billion, and three-way services trade exceeded $42 billion in
1991.
Mexico is our fastest growing export market. United
States' exports to Mexico in 1992 were $40.6 billion, up from a
paltry $12 billion in 1986 and representing a 22% increase over
1991 (compared to a 5% increase in exports to other countries).
Exports to Canada totalled $91 billion in 1992, representing an
increase of 6% over 1991.
The result of this surge in exports has been a surge in jobs
for Americans-upwards of 700,000 supported by these exports
and our trade surplus with Mexico of $5.4 billion in 1992. Mex-
ico has surpassed trading giants like Germany, France, Italy,
and Great Britain to be our third-largest market after Canada
and Japan. But Mexico surpassed even Japan in 1992 to be our
second largest market for manufactured goods. In fact, 85% of
the U.S. jobs associated with our exports to Mexico are in manu-
facturing. Mexico is our third-largest agricultural market (after
Japan and Canada).
The U.S. surplus with Mexico in manufactured goods trade
totalled $7.5 billion in 1992, representing one of our largest
manufactured goods trade surpluses (with total U.S. sales of
manufactured goods to Mexico totalling approximately $35
billion).
Virtually every state's exports to both Mexico and Canada
have increased in the past five years. Forty-eight states have
seen their exports to Mexico increase substantially since 1987.
The benefits are not just going to the border states. Even states
where anti-NAFTA arguments are often aimed have seen their
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exports to Mexico and related employment explode. Penn-
sylvania, New York, Illinois, Ohio, and North Carolina, all
states where lobbying against NAFTA was strong, are enjoying
incredible gains in their exports to Mexico. Pennsylvania saw a
310% increase from 1987 to 1992; New York, 82%; Ohio, 98%;
and Illinois, 385%.
B. Low-Wage Markets Are Still Important
How can this be? How can a relatively low-wage country be
so important for U.S. exports and support so many American
export workers? Well, Mexicans simply are not too poor to buy
U.S. goods.
Mexico prefers U.S. products, buying nearly 70% of its
imports from the United States. Mexico's middle-income and
higher-income market is estimated to total 20 million people:
about the size of Canada's entire consumer market, or several
European countries put together. No one would suggest we
should ignore these markets.
Mexicans spend more of every dollar earned (15 cents of
every dollar per capita) on U.S. goods than our high-income
trading partners. Japan and the European Community only
spend 2 cents of every dollar per capita on American imports.
Last year, Mexican consumers purchased an average of $450
worth of U.S. products. By contrast, the average Japanese
spent $385 on U.S. products, despite the fact that Japanese
incomes are five or more times as high as the average Mexican
income.
Mexico spends a higher percentage of its Gross Domestic
Product on U.S. goods than Japan, the newly industrialized
countries of Asia (NICs), and Eastern Europe (7.8 times more
per dollar than Japan; 1.5 times more than the NICs; 4.7 times
more than Japan and the NICs combined; 21.7 times more than
Eastern Europe; and 4.9 times more than Japan, the NICs, and
Eastern Europe combined).
Exports to Mexico are growing twice as fast as imports.
Exports to Mexico have grown at an average annual rate of 23%
since 1987, compared to 15% for Japan, 14% for the European
Community, 9% for Canada, and 14% for the whole world.
Manufactured goods exports rose to $34.5 billion in 1992, repre-
senting 85% of the total. Textile and apparel exports have trip-
led to $1.6 billion, creating a trade surplus in the sector of $81
million, in spite of 10% to 20% Mexican tariffs. Autos and auto
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parts rose from $1.8 billion in 1986 to $6.8 billion in 1992. Steel
companies sell 19% of all of their exports to Mexico.
Capital goods exports rose by 133% during 1987 to 1992, to
$13.6 billion. But exports of all other products rose by 203% to
$27 billion. Agricultural exports have more than tripled since
1986, and high-value products now account for almost 70% of
all U.S. agricultural sales to Mexico, compared to 40% in 1987.
Consumer goods exports to Mexico have grown at 31% annually,
compared to exports to the European Community at 16% and
Japan at 15%, and have tripled since 1986 (rising from $1 bil-
lion to $3.4 billion in 1991). United States' services exports are
up 137% from 1987 to 1991, reaching $8.3 billion in a very
closed market.
The strong growth in exports to Mexico in 1991 signifi-
cantly increased the number of related jobs to over 700,000, up
from 274,000 in 1986. These jobs are largely in the production
of manufactured goods, which account for 85% of U.S. exports to
Mexico. Estimates are that by 1995, one million U.S. workers
will owe their jobs to U.S. exports to Mexico.
Even industries like textiles, footwear, apparel, steel, and
auto parts, often characterized as highly sensitive to foreign
competition, are doing very well in exporting to Mexico, even
with the high Mexican tariffs and other barriers that NAFTA
will remove.
C. When We Trade with Mexico, Aren't We Just
Selling to Ourselves?
Some people have such a hard time believing that Mexico is
so important to the United States that they will say that all
these export statistics are lies. They will tell you that all of
these impressive exports are really just going into production-
sharing operations, maquiladoras for processing goods to be
resold to the United States. But they are dead wrong.
While U.S. export data does include exports to maqui-
ladoras, these exports amounted to only about 22% of all U.S.
exports to Mexico last year, and this share is declining. The
U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) estimates that
exports for consumption in Mexico account for 84% of recent
U.S. export growth.
Those who do not want to believe that a Latin American
country can be a strategic market for North American goods
claim that all we are selling to Mexico is capital goods. They
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define capital goods as pieces of factories that we ship to Mexico
so that they can be erected to produce, with low wages, goods
that will be sold back to us and put U.S. workers out of their
jobs.
Wrong again. Capital goods exports happen to make the
United States the world's largest exporter, and Mexico (along
with Europe and Japan) is a major market for them. Capital
goods exports to Mexico include things like airplanes, telephone
switches, and tractors. Mexico will get these goods somewhere,
and without NAFTA it has no incentive to buy them from us.
The fact is, capital goods are not a disproportionate share of
U.S. exports to Mexico. They comprise 40% of our exports to the
world, but only 33% of our exports to Mexico, and their share is
declining. Meanwhile, our consumer goods exports and agricul-
tural exports are rising rapidly. Eleven percent of U.S. exports
to Mexico are consumer goods, nearly as large a share as our
consumer goods exports to developed countries.
D. Isn't Mexico Just Sucking Away U.S. Jobs?
The next thing you might hear from those who want to
maintain the stagnant status quo economy and job situation in
this country is that Mexico is sucking our plants and jobs south
at a frightening rate and that NAFTA just accelerates that
trend. Wrong again.
Despite the sound bites that have flooded media coverage of
NAFTA, Mexico is not a magnet pulling U.S. jobs and manufac-
turing south. Surprisingly, most U.S. manufacturing invest-
ment abroad is in high-wage, developed countries; less than a
third of U.S. manufacturing investment abroad goes to low-
wage countries.
Nearly all U.S. manufacturing facilities abroad are located
in Western Europe (50%), Canada, Japan, and Asia's NICs-in
that order. A recent survey of corporations showed that Canada
is currently the most popular foreign destination for U.S. manu-
facturing investment (18% of the total).
Latin America as a whole accounts for only 10% of U.S. for-
eign direct investment. Less than 5% of all U.S. foreign direct
investment was located in Mexico in 1992, far less than the
value of U.S. investment in Canada. Yet, Latin America is our
fastest growing regional export market, and Mexico is our fast-
est growing market!
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The fact is, because of lower worker productivity; a lack of
infrastructure, which adds to transportation costs; and a
number of other factors, Mexican workers really do not compete
with U.S. workers and plants. It costs $410 more to produce an
automobile in Mexico than in the United States. For example,
it cost Quality Coils, a Connecticut company, much more than
the wage differential ($10 per hour in Connecticut versus $5 an
hour-benefits included-in Mexico) to build in Mexico, so they
moved back.
Furthermore, NAFTA is a trade agreement, not an agree-
ment to promote the flight of investment from the United States
to Mexico. Only one chapter of NAFTA has anything to do with
protecting the rights of investors in Canada, the United States,
and Mexico. The remainder increases market access for goods
and services, protects our inventions and technologies from
piracy, makes it possible to produce our products in the United
States and export them competitively with no tariff costs, and
ensures that environmental and labor standards are never used
to attract investment or for protectionist purposes.
NAFTA does not encourage plants to move south. Instead,
it dismantles artificial Mexican incentives and requirements to
manufacture in Mexico that impede selling to that dynamic
market. Mexico's present Automotive Decree, for example,
requires producers to build two cars for export for every one car
built for sale in Mexico. It also requires car manufacturers to
use a set percentage of Mexican-made parts in every car pro-
duced. This requirement has pressured some U.S. suppliers to
move operations south of the border. By removing these
requirements, NAFTA allows auto and parts makers to produce
in lower-cost, world-class plants in the United States and export
to Mexico, the fastest growing auto market in the entire West-
ern Hemisphere.
All of this good news comes as a result of Mexico's unilat-
eral economic reforms and measures to liberalize its markets.
In 1986, Mexico began to dismantle its protectionist barriers-
first joining the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) and reducing its tariffs from as high as 100% to a
weighted average of 10%. Under President Salinas, market-
opening reforms have continued as part of a strategy to modern-
ize Mexico and prepare it to compete with the Asian tigers
(Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Indonesia) into the twenty-first
century.
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III. THE NEW MEXICO: A VITAL MARKET FOR AMERICAN
GOODS AND SERVICES
The Mexican economy has been expanding since 1989,
increasing demand for capital goods and equipment as well as
for consumer goods and agricultural products. Mexico has also
made dramatic strides to open its markets. This opening, how-
ever, is not secured for U.S. exporters without NAFTA.
Mexico has dramatically reduced its foreign public debt
from 74% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in December
1988 to only 29% of GDP in June 1992. Mexico's public debt-to-
GDP ratio (29%) compares favorably with the industrialized
economies of the United States (56%), Japan (63%), Canada
(76%), and Italy (103%).
Growth in Mexico benefits the United States. Mexico's
nearly 90 million consumers show a pronounced preference for
U.S. goods: 70% of Mexico's imports come from the United
States, compared with 21% in Japan, 17% in the European
Community, and 2% in Eastern Europe. By the year 2000,
expectations are that there will be 100 million Mexicans buying
American goods and services.
While Mexico has always been an important destination for
U.S. investment, this investment has contributed not only to
Mexico's growth, but also to jobs in the United States. As noted
earlier, less than 5% of all U.S. foreign direct investment is
located in Mexico. Yet, Mexican subsidiaries of United States
companies buy much more from the United States than our sub-
sidiaries elsewhere in the world. For every dollar spent by U.S.
subsidiaries in Mexico, forty-six cents is spent on U.S. goods
(capital equipment and components), the highest percentage
anywhere in the world.
Even more exciting for U.S. exporters is the investment
that Mexico itself is making in its infrastructure. Many of the
equipment and technology purchases to improve Mexico's infra-
structure are from U.S. suppliers and account for 33% of our
exports to Mexico.
There is no doubting the commitment that Mexico's recent
administrations (De la Madrid and Salinas) have to fundamen-
tally restructuring their economy. Their unilateral steps to
open the Mexican market and turn away from a policy of pro-
tecting domestic producers through import substitutions have
started a change in how Mexico does business within the global
economy.
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But the Mexican market opening to date has applied
equally to everyone-U.S. products and services and our com-
petitors'. NAFTA eliminates Mexico's remaining trade barriers
specifically for U.S. products. So NAFTA not only guarantees
the market access we are benefitting from today, it further
opens Mexico to U.S. goods and services.
Accompanying the market opening measures in Mexico,
President Salinas undertook, as he has stated numerous times,
an ambitious program to bring Mexico "from the third world to
the first world by the end of the century." This objective has
resulted in major policies and programs to invest in infrastruc-
ture, environmental protection, and systems modernization,
among other things. This program is generating tremendous
business opportunities for U.S. exporters. NAFTA will expand
these opportunities.
A- Infrastructure
The Salinas Administration has made a major and highly
visible commitment to turn around the stagnant investment
patterns of the 1980s. Through privatization of formerly state-
controlled infrastructure and a strong reliance on private
investment, Mexico has undertaken a massive effort to modern-
ize and build infrastructure of all kinds: telecommunications,
roads and ocean ports, enough electrical power plants and dis-
tribution grids to effectively service the needs of its growing
industry, water purification and distribution systems, and envi-
ronmental cleanup infrastructure such as sewage treatment
plants and incinerators. Billions of dollars in private and lever-
aged public dollars are being spent each year in what has to be
one of the most ambitious national infrastructure improvement
projects in the world.
B. Telecommunications
The recently privatized state telephone monopoly, Telmex,
has embarked on a huge capital investment program calling for
a 63% increase in total infrastructure with expenditures of
around $13 billion by the year 2000. In 1991, $1.8 billion was
spent. Results for 1992 and 1993 should show $2.3 billion
spent per year for a total of $6.4 billion in the first three years of
privatization.
A concrete example of this capital investment is Hughes
Aircraft Company's $200 million contract for two communica-
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tions satellites for the Mexican government. This contract will
support an average of 250 to 300 jobs over three years in
Hughes Aircraft's Long Beach facility and various U.S.
subcontractors.
C. Energy
Big changes are also happening in Mexico's energy sector.
Market liberalization reforms, which have been so dramatic in
most of the Mexican economy, have been slow to reach the
energy sector largely because Mexico's Constitution restricts
ownership of oil and gas resources to the state. But it is widely
acknowledged that to avoid becoming a net oil importer, Mexico
must dramatically overhaul its energy sector.
In June 1992, the Mexican national oil company, PEMEX,
reorganized its operations into four separate subsidiaries: an
exploration and production unit, a refining unit, a natural gas
and primary petrochemicals unit, and a secondary petrochemi-
cals unit. Other internal reforms within PEMEX indicate its
willingness to explore creative methods of working with foreign
suppliers and contractors so it can move to the level of produc-
tion and efficiency in energy services that Mexican producers
need to compete. NAFTA opens up government procurement
opportunities for U.S. firms with PEMEX. The new structure of
PEMEX will make it attractive to contract for services and
equipment with U.S. energy firms.
NAFTA provides new investment opportunities for electric-
ity generating facilities for "own use," cogeneration, and
independent power production. NAFTA allows investors to
acquire, establish, and operate such facilities without any
involvement from the state energy monopoly, Comisi6n Federal
de Electricidad (CFE). Foreign investors may also purchase or
build independent power production facilities.
NAFTA also allows for the cross-border trade of natural gas
and basic petrochemicals. The terms of any such sales to Mex-
ico must be negotiated with PEMEX, which must act as the
importer in Mexico.
In essence, this means that North American firms will be
allowed to build, own, and operate electricity generating plants
for self generation, cogeneration, and independent power pro-
duction in Mexico. United States' natural gas suppliers will be
able to sell to Mexican factories through PEMEX to meet import
1994]
542 University of Puget Sound Law Review
demands, which are projected to reach 800 million cubic feet per
day within the next two years.
D. Procurement
New rules on government procurement that Mexico and
Canada will adopt as a result of NAFTA will open up opportuni-
ties to U.S. firms seeking government contracts in those coun-
tries. NAFTA gives North American suppliers immediate and
growing access to the Mexican government procurement mar-
ket, not only PEMEX and CFE, but also other government enti-
ties. NAFTA also breaks new ground by including services for
the first time, substantially increasing export opportunities for
North American providers of a wide variety of services includ-
ing construction, environmental, and software.
E. Environmental Products and Services
According to the Mexican Embassy, Mexico spends the
equivalent of 1% of its gross national product on environmental
improvement. In 1992, the total market for pollution control
products and services in Mexico was approximately $1 billion.
Average growth of the Mexican pollution control products and
services market is expected to reach 20% per annum during the
period 1992 to 1994, and U.S. exports of environmental prod-
ucts and services to Mexico are expected to grow by 20% during
1993.
Currently, very few nontariff barriers impede sales of U.S.
pollution control equipment and services in Mexico. Tariffs on
pollution control equipment and services range from 0% to 20%.
Under NAFTA, tariffs on most pollution control equipment will
be eliminated on the date of implementation of the Agreement
or within five years of implementation. The elimination of tar-
iffs will stimulate U.S. exports by further enhancing the price
competitiveness of U.S. pollution control equipment and serv-
ices with non-NAFTA products.
Continued growth of the Mexican economy, spurred by
NAFTA, will encourage increased sales of new U.S. pollution
control equipment and services in Mexico as citizens demand a
cleaner environment and the financial resources exist for these
purchases.
Increasingly strict Mexican enforcement of its sweeping
1988 General Law of Ecological Equilibrium and Environmen-
tal Protection will necessitate diligent maintenance of existing
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environmental control equipment. Mexico's recent intensifica-
tion of enforcement of its environmental laws is also contribut-
ing to increased sales of U.S. environmental products and
services in the Mexican market. Mexico's new superagency, the
Secretaria de Desarrollo Social (SEDESOL), is empowered to
set and enforce Mexico's environmental norms and regulations.
Reports by individual Mexican businesses, as well as a report
issued in 1993 by the American Chamber of Commerce in Mex-
ico, indicate that notable increases in both the number of
SEDESOL inspectors employed and the frequency and serious-
ness of their inspections have made compliance with Mexican
environmental law a high priority for firms operating in this
market. Implementation of NAFTA is likely to reinforce this
trend by strengthening enforcement efforts and by generating
additional resources in Mexico to address environmental
problems.
F. Services
The market for services is 'another very important new
opportunity under NAFTA. NAFTA opens Mexico's $146 billion
services market to U.S. telecommunications companies, banks,
insurance firms, law and accounting firms, and transportation
companies. NAFTA will also increase access to Canada's $285
billion services market. To make it possible for service provid-
ers to have real access to these markets, NAFTA allows profes-
sionals to freely cross the border. This means, for example, that
an equipment vendor can offer follow-up services to its clients-
a very important advantage when it comes to sales.
G. Success Stories
Every kind of American company has the opportunity to
benefit from trade with Mexico and Canada, especially with the
increased market access afforded by NAFTA. The U.S. Depart-
ment of Commerce Mexico desk responds to over two thousand
business callers a week, helping them with their questions
about exporting to Mexico. Any state or city trade office or
chamber of commerce will tell you that they too are flooded with
business calls about the Mexican market.
Businesses from small to large, minority-owned and
women-owned, in every sector of manufacturing and services,
are reaping the benefits of doing business with our neighbors.
And they hire new workers to handle the increased business.
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* Pace Picante Sauce in San Antonio has captured 30% of the
Mexican red hot sauce market in Monterrey and is planning
an expansion into the rest of Mexico.
* Dell Computers in Austin, Texas is led by the youngest CEO
ever to make it onto the Fortune 500 list, Michael Dell. It
has just opened operations in Mexico to sell its personal
computers and to provide the 24-hour customer service and
follow-up for which Dell is famous.
o Falcon Products, a furniture manufacturer, has operations
in St. Louis, Missouri; Tennessee; Arkansas; and Juarez,
Mexico. Thanks to its Mexican production, it has increased
employment and increased exports worldwide.
* Price Club has linked with one of Mexico's largest retail
chains to serve Mexican consumers.
* Walmart's Mexico City store, just opened in October 1993, is
doing the largest volume of business of all its stores.
* Detroit Diesel-Allison is also creating jobs in the United
States by doing business with Mexico. Detroit Diesel has
increased employment in its U.S. operations by 46% since
1990, thanks to its Mexican business. Most of these jobs are
in Detroit Diesel-Allison's manufacturing facilities in Michi-
gan and Ohio. Twenty-six percent of this increase repre-
sents brand new jobs created to fill the demand for its
engines in Mexico.
Numerous other companies, ranging from architecture to
environmental products and services to trucking companies, are
seeing their business with Mexico grow by leaps and bounds.
They look forward to the additional business they will enjoy
with NAFTA.
IV. WHAT WILL NAFTA Do To CONTIrNE THESE MARKET
OPPORTUNITIES?
NAFTA does much more than reduce tariff barriers. It pro-
vides brand new access to key markets for services and govern-
ment procurement. It safeguards our sensitive sectors. And it
reduces regulations that have distorted some manufacturers'
decisions to relocate investment. NAFTA will stimulate the
U.S. economy in several ways.
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A. Eliminating Tariffs
NAFTA will eliminate tariffs on industrial and agricultural
goods made or grown chiefly in the United States, Mexico, and
Canada. Mexico's tariffs are currently two-and-a-half times
higher than ours. Sixty-five percent of eligible U.S. exports of
industrial goods to Mexico will be duty free within five years of
NAFTA's implementation. Within five years, three quarters of
our auto parts exports to Mexico will be duty free. Mexican tar-
iffs on U.S. autos and light trucks will be cut in half (from 20%
to 10%) as soon as NAFTA is implemented and will be reduced
to zero over the next ten years for cars and five years for light
trucks.
B. Opening Huge New Markets for Services
NAFTA will open Mexico's $146 billion services market to
U.S. telecommunications companies (both equipment and serv-
ices), banks, insurance firms, law and accounting firms, and
transportation companies. NAFTA will also increase access to
Canada's $285 billion services market.
C. Lifting Restrictions That Hurt U.S. Exports
NAFTA will lift restrictions on companies in Mexico, thus
freeing manufacturers to import more components from U.S.
firms. Mexican trade balancing and domestic content rules will
be eliminated, permitting additional sourcing of U.S. inputs.
And for the first time, U.S. firms operating in Mexico will
receive the same treatment as Mexican-owned firms. Mexico
has agreed to drop export performance requirements, which
presently force companies to export as a condition of being
allowed to invest. Often, those exports have been directed at
the nearest market-the United States.
D. Removing Nontariff Barriers
NAFTA will remove other trade barriers, such as Mexico's
quotas and import licensing barriers to U.S. exports of corn,
wheat, dairy, poultry, and other agricultural products.
Strong rules of origin require substantial North American
parts and labor content before a product can benefit from
NAFTA tariff cuts. These rules contain tracing requirements so
that individual parts can be identified to determine the North
American content of major components and subassemblies
1994] 545
546 University of Puget Sound Law Review
(such as engines). Tracing requirements ensure that the bene-
fits of NAFTA flow to firms that produce in North America.
By phasing out duty drawback for goods that are shipped
from outside North America for assembly in foreign trade zones
or maquiladoras, NAFTA prevents non-NAFTA countries from
shipping products duty free to the United States through Can-
ada or Mexico.
E. Giving Everyone Time To Adjust
NAFTA allows plenty of time for industries and workers in
sensitive sectors to adjust to full competition by gradually phas-
ing out tariffs over fifteen years and by providing safeguards
against injurious import surges.
While much of the discussion surrounding NAFTA has
focused on economic growth and jobs, the gains that will accrue
to consumers in all three countries are equally important.
Trade barriers bring enormous costs to consumers. For exam-
ple, a recent Canadian study found that protecting the Cana-
dian clothing industry cost lower-income households four times
as much as it cost higher-income households.
The gains from free trade will be passed on to U.S. consum-
ers in the form of greater consumer choices and lower prices. In
recent congressional testimony, proponents of NAFTA have
applauded, "The longer growing season in Mexico will make it
possible for U.S. consumers to enjoy a wide variety of fresh
products during the winter months, and without substantial
detriment to U.S. producers."1 "[Tihe elimination of trade bar-
riers among the NAFTA countries will enhance the competitive-
ness of U.S. businesses. This will allow for expansion of U.S.-
based companies into the global marketplace and lower the cost
for U.S., Mexican, and Canadian consumers of imported
products."2
NAFTA does not change in any way U.S. laws to combat
unfair trade practices, which will continue to be vigorously
enforced to prevent dumping and unfair subsidies.
What do we give up in exchange? Almost nothing. Already,
50% of U.S. imports from Mexico enter duty free. And the
1. North American Free Trade Agreement: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Trade
of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 357 (1992) (testimony of
Hon. John R. Block, former Secretary of Agriculture).
2. Id. at 431-32 (statement of Fermin Cuza, on behalf of the American Association
of Exporters and Importers).
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removal of the remainder of our tariffs on Mexico's products
over the fifteen-year time period in NAFTA means dismantling
an average U.S. tariff of only 4%, compared with Mexico's aver-
age tariff on our goods of 10%.
The success of NAFTA and of economic liberalization in
Mexico is a powerful inducement to other Latin American coun-
tries to adopt economic, trade, and investment liberalization
that will support more rapid economic growth. The U.S. goal is
to encourage market liberalization throughout the hemisphere
and, ultimately, the creation of a hemisphere-wide trade area.
The objective of NAFTA is to open markets. It does not create a
closed regional trading block and does not erect new barriers to
nonparticipants. NAFTA is fully consistent with GATT criteria
for free trade agreements and with U.S. support for strengthen-
ing the multilateral trading system in the Uruguay Round.
V. NAFTA AND THE ENVIRONMENT
President Bush agreed, when his request to extend the
"fast track" authority to negotiate unamendable trade agree-
ments was before Congress, that he would negotiate environ-
ment and labor issues on a parallel track with NAFTA. As a
candidate, and shortly after his inauguration, President Clinton
made clear that while NAFTA as signed by President Bush was
a good agreement, he would not ask Congress to vote on imple-
menting legislation for NAFTA until supplemental agreements
on labor and the environment were negotiated. The United
States, Canada, and Mexico concluded their negotiations on
these Supplemental Agreements on Environment and Labor
Cooperation, as well as agreements on import surges in Septem-
ber 1993.
Actually, NAFTA has an unusual amount of environmental
protection built into the Agreement. The NAFTA parties
agreed that economic development should take place in an envi-
ronmentally sound and sustainable manner. NAFTA-led
growth will generate the additional resources necessary to
increase funding of environmental projects and to enforce envi-
ronmental laws and regulations. According to former Adminis-
trator Reilly of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
NAFTA is "the greenest agreement ever negotiated" and sets a
significant marker for future trade agreements.
NAFTA's unprecedented "green language" explicitly
ensures our right to safeguard the environment with strong pro-
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visions on standards, health, and safety measures. NAFTA per-
mits parties to impose stringent environmental standards on
new investments, so long as they apply equally to domestic and
foreign investors, while renouncing the lowering of environmen-
tal standards as a means to induce investment.
States retain their right to enact standards that are more
stringent than those at the national or international level.
NAFTA explicitly recognizes the right of a participating country
to prohibit the importation of goods that do not meet its stan-
dards and the right to carry out border inspections.
NAFTA in no way requires the United States to lower its
environmental standards. In fact, its provisions encourage
NAFTA countries to strengthen environmental standards and
to harmonize them. For example, we currently do not permit
fruits or vegetables with non-U.S. approved pesticide residues
to enter the United States. This will not change under the
NAFTA.
The NAFTA process has increased environmentalists' par-
ticipation in trade policy. Representatives of the environmental
community have been appointed to each of the key trade policy
advisory committees. The U.S. Trade Representative (USTR),
with the help of EPA and other agencies, conducted and
released an environmental review addressing the effects of
NAFTA. Public hearings were held in six cities. The review
concludes that NAFTA will enhance environmental protection
by providing Mexico with additional resources to address its
problems and will ease environmental pressures on the border
as free trade encourages industry to expand beyond the maqui-
ladora sectors.
An Integrated Border Environmental Plan has also been
prepared by the EPA and its sister agency in Mexico. Public
hearings were held on this plan in nine U.S. cities and seven
Mexican cities-the first time the government of Mexico had
held public hearings.
NAFTA's parallel environment track has expanded and
strengthened our network of cooperative activities with Mexico
on the full range of pollution and conservation issues. For exam-
ple, several other projects to improve environmental coopera-
tion are underway: the Bilateral Working Group on
Environmental Enforcement (begun in June 1991); joint public
advisory committees for border issues; programs to encourage
public reporting of potential violations of environmental law;
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and a trilateral commission, which will review and monitor
environmental issues, including enforcement, on an ongoing
basis.
The Supplemental Agreement on Environmental Coopera-
tion, concluded in August 1993, creates the North American
Commission on Environmental Cooperation. The Commission
will set in motion a process for sustained, long-term, effective
trilateral environmental cooperation, and represents a unique
forum in which the United States, Mexico, and Canada will be
able to work together to ensure that NAFTA will promote both
economic growth and strong environmental protection.
The United States and Mexico also agreed in October 1993
to create two new institutions to address the environmental
problems along our joint border. The first is a U.S.-Mexican
Border Environment Cooperation Commission (BECC) to help
coordinate projects and assemble financing packages. The sec-
ond is a new U.S.-Mexican North American Development Bank
(NAD Bank), to provide gap financing to support border envi-
ronmental infrastructure projects and NAFTA-related commu-
nity adjustment and investment programs.
The North American commitment to a sound environment
represents an important commercial opportunity for U.S. prov-
iders of environmental goods and services, including environ-
mentally-sound manufacturing processes. Trade restrictions on
environmental goods and services will be among those most
rapidly phased out. The manner in which the United States,
Mexico, and Canada addressed the issue of the environment, in
the context of trade negotiations, is precedent setting, which
may explain why the Audubon Society, the National Wildlife
Federation, the Natural Resources Defense Council, and the
Environmental Defense Fund endorsed the passage of NAFTA.
VI. NAFTA AND LABOR
NAFTA will give Americans more opportunities in higher-
skill, higher-wage jobs. Virtually every study of the economic
impact of NAFTA finds that employment levels will rise in each
country, as will wages.
Much research has been devoted to the potential economic
and social effects of a North American free trade area. So many
studies have been released, in fact, that the USTR requested
the ITC to conduct an investigation on the technical merits and
major findings of the economy-wide models. The ITC reported
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"a surprising degree of unanimity in the results regarding the
aggregate effects of a NAFTA. All three countries are expected
to gain from a NAFTA. The greatest impact will be on the Mex-
ican economy, with less impact on the Canadian and U.S.
economies."
These studies report that NAFTA would increase U.S. real
GDP by up to 0.5%, with one study calculating a gain of as
much as 2.1%. And all but one study projected U.S. employ-
ment increases.
For Mexico, estimated increases in real GDP go as high as
11.4%, and real wages increases as high as 16.2%. Although
only three of the studies examined the implications of NAFTA
for Canada, one study projected Canadian employment to rise
between 7.3% and 11.0%.
The ITC points out that most of the studies are static and
thus probably undercount the true gains from NAFTA. This
means that the studies are unable to project the impact of the
accelerated rate of economic growth or dynamic gains from
trade that can result from the accelerated transfer of technol-
ogy, access to specialized capital goods, integration of produc-
tion, and accumulation of skills. Such changes will likely affect
Mexico most, increasing its purchasing power for more U.S.
goods and services. Calculations of dynamic effects show that
Mexico's dynamic gains from NAFTA may be on the order of
50% of real Mexican GDP over twenty-five years.
In the spring of 1993, the Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) released its analysis of NAFTA and its effect on U.S.
employment. The CBO concluded that the anticipated displace-
ment of U.S. workers that might occur over the fifteen years of
implementation ranges between 200,000 and 500,000. The
CBO concluded that this number is dwarfed by the employment
dislocation that will occur in that same time period because of
other factors, citing the 20 million workers in the 1980s who
lost and changed jobs.
Nevertheless, much has been said about disparities in
wages, worker rights, and safety standards. The NAFTA nego-
tiations created an historic opportunity for bilateral cooperation
to improve Mexican labor standards and enforcement. While
economic growth in Mexico will provide increased resources for
enforcement, U.S.-Mexico labor cooperation has provided an
opportunity for Mexico to accelerate the benefits accruing to
workers through U.S. technical assistance and training.
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A plan under the auspices of the U.S.-Mexico Binational
Commission, an ongoing government-to-government working
group involving every cabinet agency with binational concerns,
and a memorandum of understanding signed by the two secre-
taries of labor, has joint activities underway in the following
areas:
" comparative studies in safety and health, child labor, labor
law, and worker rights;
" technical assistance and training on safety in high hazard
industries;
* Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
sponsored training in U.S. laboratories to help Mexico
develop an improved workplace health enforcement
program;
" exchange of OSHA's computer information system and regu-
latory language.
The Supplemental Agreement on Labor Cooperation
ensures that labor standards will be upheld and that lax
enforcement cannot be exploited for unfair advantage by
NAFTA partners.
VII. THE NAFTA CALENDAR
Negotiations over NAFTA began in July 1991. Because the
three countries knew that freer North American trade was a
win-win-win proposition, the negotiations were largely noncon-
frontational. It was relatively easy for the three countries to
find mutually beneficial positions.
Congress was consulted at every step of the negotiating
process. In fact, the consultations conducted on NAFTA were
far more extensive and intensive than have ever been held with
Congress on a major trade agreement. According to the USTR,
an average of three briefings per work day were held with mem-
bers of Congress and staff since the talks were launched. In
fact, Chairman Rostenkowski of the House Ways and Means
Committee said in a July 1992 speech, "[W]e cannot fault the
Administration for secrecy."
On August 12, 1992, U.S., Mexican, and Canadian chief
negotiators completed negotiating NAFTA as a "handshake"
agreement.
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NAFTA was subject to fast track rules for consideration by
Congress. Fast track authority is granted by Congress to allow
the President to negotiate international agreements and to
assure the negotiating partners that the deal reached will not
be amended by the U.S. Congress. Contrary to the nickname,
the process for fast track consideration was actually quite
lengthy, requiring a number of steps.
After the handshake agreement was reached in August, the
USTR asked its private sector advisory committees (over one
thousand members) to review the agreement and write reports
on its impact as required by the fast track rules. Meanwhile,
lawyers began to "scrub" the text of the agreement to make sure
that the legal language reflected what the negotiators had
agreed to.
On September 18, 1992, President Bush formally notified
Congress by submitting the agreement and the advisory com-
mittees' reports to Congress, thus starting the ninety-calendar-
day "consultative period" required under fast track rules. Con-
gress was able to ask questions about the agreement for ninety
days before the President was allowed to sign it as a final
agreement.
On October 7, 1992, President Bush, together with Presi-
dent Salinas and Prime Minister Mulroney, witnessed the "ini-
tialling" of the legal text of the agreement in San Antonio. On
December 17, 1992, when the ninety-day consultation period
expired, President Bush signed the agreement, as did President
Salinas and Prime Minister Mulroney. The signed agreement
was eligible for fast track treatment, meaning that once drafted,
the implementing legislation for the agreement could be sub-
mitted to Congress for a vote at any time, with no congressional
amendment allowed.
On March 17, 1993, negotiations on supplemental agree-
ments for labor, the environment, and import surges began. On
August 13, 1993, the supplemental agreements for labor, envi-
ronment, and safeguards were concluded. The legal text for
these agreements was submitted by the President as part of the
NAFTA package of implementing legislation.
NAFTA's implementing legislation went to Congress the
first week of November 1993, although hearings on the forma-
tive legislation, and even committee votes, had already been
held. The House voted on and passed NAFTA on November 17
by a vote of 234 to 200. The Senate passed it three days later by
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a vote of 61 to 38. NAFTA's implementation date, the date
when tariff reductions began, was January 1, 1994.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The United States, Mexico, and Canada entered into nego-
tiations for NAFTA because it was absolutely the right thing to
do for our countries. In the face of European integration and
strategic partnerships in the Pacific Rim, it is vitally important
for the United States to strengthen our ties with our North
American commercial partners and with the rest of the Western
Hemisphere.
NAFTA is an historic agreement. It is an ambitious effort
to eliminate barriers to agricultural, manufacturing, and serv-
ices trade, to remove investment restrictions, and to protect
intellectual property rights. And, NAFTA is the first agreement
in the history of U.S. trade policy that directly addresses envi-
ronmental concerns.
United States' strategic policy must be focused on that
which builds security for our workers: exports and the high-
paying jobs they support. The real damage to U.S. workers or
our common environment would be in not implementing
NAFTA. As President Salinas has said, an opportunity such as
this comes along once in a generation. Had we squandered this
chance for beneficial growth, we would have harmed the U.S.
economy, hobbled export-led job creation in the United States,
and denied Mexico the resources it needs to protect the environ-
ment, improve the work place, and raise its standard of living.
We are on the verge of creating a new relationship between
our three nations, one that changes attitudes and raises living
standards from the rain forests of Southern Mexico to the frozen
tundra of the Klondike. Capturing this moment will take tre-
mendous effort by individuals, businesses, and governments,
because change is always more difficult than defending the sta-
tus quo. But across the country, businesses and workers are
recognizing that NAFTA's dividends are immense.
The facts cannot be denied. It is in our national interest to
secure access to Mexico's young and growing market. We would
have gained nothing by freezing in our tracks, rejecting NAFTA
and denying ourselves growing access to our best markets. We
do nothing for America's workers and American competitive-
ness by running from change.
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With NAFTA, the United States has a chance to join forces
with our neighboring economies, to increase markets for our
products and services, and to secure a better future for our
workers. NAFTA provides us with leverage in global trade
talks and shows the rest of Latin America that the United
States is committed to free trade with developing and developed
countries alike.
